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Death Benefit Payments To Widows Of Deceased
Corporate Employees - Gift Or Income?
Poyner v. C.I.R. 1
Upon the death of its president and majority shareholder, and pursuant to resolutions giving recognition to
past services rendered, the corporation, in 1956, transferred
to the president's widow a Cadillac and cash valued at
$9910.05 as a continuation of the decedent's salary. The
payments were not made pursuant to any "contract, plan,
policy, practice or understanding made or in effect prior
to the Decedent's death."'2 The corporation was under no
obligation to pay any additional compensation, and it apparently derived no benefit from the payment. The widow
had performed no services for the corporation. Upon these
facts, the Tax Court found that the payments were not,
as contended by the widow, excludible from gross income
under Section 102(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
19543 as gifts, but rather that they constituted taxable income under Section 611 subject only to the $5000 death
benefit exclusion of Section 101(b) .5 On appeal to the
Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Sobeloff, ruled that the decision below must be vacated and remanded so that certain
1301 F. 2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962) rev'g. Estate of Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65
(1960).
.Supra, n. 1, 290. This note is limited to consideration of voluntary
death benefit payments. It is well settled that payments made pursuant
to a contract or other legal obligation are taxable as additional compensation for the decedent's services. See Flarsheiin v. United States, 62 F.
Supp. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1945) aff'd. 156 F. 2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Estate
of Arthur W. Davis, 52,238 P-H Memo T.C. (1952) ; I.T. 3972, 1949-2
Cum. Bull. 15. C)'. Florence E. Carr, 28 T.C. 779 (1957) (Nonacq.), IRS
appeal dismissed (nolle pro8.) (1958).
§ 102. Gifts and inheritances
"(a) General Rule. - Gross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." All references hereafter made to the Code and to statutory sections refer to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or sections thereof, unless otherwise indicated.
"§ 61. Gross income defined
"(a) General definition. - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services ... "
S§ 101(b) Employees' death benefits."(1) General rule. - Gross income does not include amounts received
(whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the
estate of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an
employer and are paid by reason of the death of the employee.
(2) Special rules for paragraph (1).(A) $5000 limitation. The aggregate amounts excludable under
paragraph (1) with respect to the death of any employee shall not
exceed $5000."

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIII

additional factors not covered by the parties in their stipulation in the Tax Court could be considered.
The controversial distinction between gift and income
has had a long and turbulent history. 6 The Internal Revenue Service has by no means maintained a consistent
position in the area of widow's payments, but it was the
issuance of a 1950 ruling which gave rise to judicial controversy which has continued until the present day.7 To
counter the Commissioner's contention that such payments
were in consideration of the deceased officer's services, the
widow-taxpayer argued that the transfers were mere gifts
and therefore not taxable." In the numerous cases over the
years, the widows were consistently successful. 9 Finally,
in 1958, the Commissioner announced his capitulation by
1The first officially reported case before the Board of Tax Appeals
related to this problem. John H. Parrott, 1 B.T.A. 1 (1924).
7 On the particular problem of corporate payments to the widows of
deceased officers and employees, the government first stated its position
in T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259 (unpublished) (1914), and in
O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921), both of which ruled that such payments were non-taxable gifts. In 1939, the Commissioner issued I.T.
3329, 1939-2 Cur. Bull. 153, which, while reiterating this position, stated
the payments would be classed as gifts so long as the widow had rendered
no services. This appeared to be no more than a crystallization of Regulation 118, § 39.22(,a)-2, promulgated under the 1939 Code, which provided
gift treatment where no services had been rendered to the corporation.
However, intended or not, I.T. 3329 shifted the emphasis from lack of
services by anyone to the payor (corporation) to lack of services by the
recipient (widow). This shift was noted by the Tax Court in Louise K.
Aprill, 13 T.C. 707 (1949) (Nonacq.) which cited I.T. 3329 and found a
gift because no services had been rendered by the widow in return for
the payments. Then, in 1946, the Fifth Circuit handed down a decision
in Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F. 2d 467 (1946) cert. den. 350 U.S. 821 (1947),
holding that there was no necessity that services be rendered by the
payee; a payment would be taxable as long as the payor was one to
whom services had been rendered. With this decision in hand, the Commissioner issued I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cur. Bull. 9, which revoked O.D. 1017
and modified I.T. 3329 and held that payments to the widow of a
deceased employee in consideration of services rendered by the employee
would be taxable to the widow even though she hersel had rendered no
services.
'For an excellent comprehensive coverage of the area, see Pelisek, Tao
Treatment of Payments to the Widows of Corporate Offlcers and Employees, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 16 (1960). Some of the factors given varying
degrees of consideration by the courts in deciding whether or not a gift
was intended are: (a) whether the death benefit was measured by the
decedent's salary; (b) whether payment was to the widow or to the
estate; (c) whether the corporation has realized any benefit from the
payment; (d) the wording of the corporate resolution authorizing the
payment; (e) whether the resolution has been submitted to the shareholders, or merely passed on by the Board of Directors (on the theory
that only the shareholders may give away corporate assets) ; (f) whether
the payment has been charged as an expense on the corporate books and/or
deducted on the tax return; (g) testimony of corporate directors, officers
and shareholders; and (h) past practices of the corporation. See also
Groh, Voluntary Payments to an Employee's Widow, 36 Taxes 333 (1958).
'See Pelisek, 8upra, n. 3, footnotes 20 & 21.
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declaring that he would no longer litigate cases involving
voluntary payments to widows by their deceased husbands' employers arising under the 1939 Code. 10
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, litigation
became temporarily diverted into a new area. A 1951
amendment to the 1939 Code had exempted contractual
death benefit payments from taxation to the extent of
$5000.11 However, the analogous provision of the 1954
Code removed the requirement that the payments be made
pursuant to contract; 12 i.e., voluntary death benefits now
became subject to the $5000 exclusion.13 It was contended
by the Internal Revenue Service that § 101 (b) was intended
to cover all payments to widows, voluntary or contractual,
including those that would have been classified as fully
exempt gifts under Sec. 102 (a) of the 1954 Code. There
was a small measure of judicial support for this view.14
However, such a contention had no logical foundation; it
produced the anomaly of a taxable gift - a direct contradiction of Sec. 102. The courts, when specifically required to rule on the point, held, apparently without
exception, that Sec. 101(b) did not supersede Sec. 102(a);
that if a death benefit payment was in reality a gift, it
would be completely exempt from taxation. 5 In view of
these developments, the Commissioner, in 1962, announced
that he would no longer contend that the exclusion for a
payment received by a widow from her deceased husband's
former employer is limited to $5000 where the payment
otherwise qualifies as a gift."0
The end of the controversy concerning Section 101(b)
signaled a return to the basic issue of whether a particular death benefit payment was actually a gift to the widow
0Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914. It will be noted, however,
that the ruling leaves the Revenue Service free to litigate cases involving
dividends or where there existed clear evidence that the payments were
intended as compensation.
"1939 I.R.C., § 22(b) (1) (B), added by § 302(a), Revenue Act of 1951.
Supra, n. 5.
2The new provision contained a second change from the 1951 Code in
that the maximum exclusion under § 101(b) became $5000 per employee,
without regard to the number of employers or beneficiaries, whereas,
under the old § 22(b) (1) (B), each employer could pay $5000 in nontaxable benefits to each (if more than one) beneficiary. Under § 101(b),
if benefits over $5000 are paid to several beneficiaries, the exclusion must
be apportioned among them.
"Dicta in Bounds v. United States, 262 F. 2d 876, 878, n. 2 (4th Cir.
1958) ; Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frankel
v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961); Cowan v. United
States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960) ; Reed v. United 'States, 177 F.
Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959) aff'd. without opinion, 277 F. 2d 456 (6th Cir.

1960).

"Rev.

Rul. 62-102, 1962 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 28, 7.
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or additional compensation for the deceased employee's
services. This meant that all the cases decided under the
1939 Code became applicable to disputes arising under
the 1954 Code, since the same issues were involved, and
since the latter Code made no other changes in the widow's
tax status."
The confused state of the law and the lack of any universal guidelines to be applied in properly defining the
nature of a gift gave rise to a review of the situation by
the Supreme Court in the now famous case of Commissioner v. Duberstein. s Two separate cases were being
considered by the Supreme Court in this opinion: Commissioner v. Duberstein:Duberstein, an officer of Corporation A, was given a Cadillac by the president of Corporation
B. Although it was a gratuitous transfer, Duberstein stated
that he probably would not have received the car were
it not for the fact that he had supplied B with names of
potential customers. Corporation B deducted the cost of
the car on its tax return. The Tax Court, finding no
intention to make a gift, held that the car was income to
Duberstein. The Sixth Circuit reversed. 19 The Supreme
Court reinstated the holding of the Tax Court, on the
ground that such holding could not be found to be "clearly
erroneous."
Stanton v. U.S.: Stanton, a church employee, was given
$20,000 upon his resignation. Although there was conflict
as to the circumstances under which he was leaving, and
as to the feeling toward him at that time, a church resolution said that the payment was a gratuity in appreciation
of services. The District Court found a gift, but the Second
Circuit reversed. 0 The Supreme Court here remanded
the case to the lower court for more adequate findings of
fact.
The Supreme Court in Duberstein rejected a test proposed by the government that "[glifts should be defined as
transfers of property made for personal as distinguished
from business reasons,"'" on the grounds: (a) that it would
17Frankel v. United States, 8upra, n. 15, aff'd. 302 F. 2d 666 (8th Cir.
1962). Judge Donovan stated at p. 778 of the District Oourt opinion: "It
is ... clear that the determination of the problem of gift versus compensaition in cases of this kind is not affected by the 1954 Code, since Section
102 appeared in the 1939 Code in the same form."
18363 U.S. 278 (1960).
- 265 F. 2d 28 (1959).
268 F. 2d 727 (1959).
2 Supra, n. 18, 284, footnote 6. Business reasons were any that established a proximate causal relationship between the payment and the
performance of services, the conduct of a business, or the production of
income. Personal reasons were considered motivations other than business
reasons.
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be going beyond the requirements of the cases before the
Court, (b) that it is based on maxims of experience rather
than principles of law, (c) that the conclusion that a payment is or is not a gift must be derived from a consideration
of all the factors in each case, and (d) that the governing
principles have already been spelled out in previous
Supreme Court opinions. The Court noted that the legal
definition of a gift has been developed by judicial interpretation, and it then restated the more important principles
of law to be applied.2 2 The Court stated that an objective
inquiry, and not the donor's characterization of his action,
is determinative of whether or not a payment is actually
a gift. The proper criterion is one that inquires into the
basic reason for the payor's action.
The approach was taken that the issue is one of fact
for determination on a case-by-case basis, and that, as a
consequence, there must exist only a limited scope of appellate review.2 3 Any fears of undue uncertainty or excessive litigation, said Justice Brennan, must be quieted by
the Congress, and not by the courts. The Court has been
firmly criticized
for its "excessive deference to the triers
' 24
of facts.

The first Tax Court case to be decided after Duberstein
was Poyner v. C.I.R. (titled in that Court, Estate of Pier2 "[T]he
statute does not use the term 'gift' in the common-law sense,
but in a more colloquial sense. This Court has indicated that a voluntary
executed transfer of his property by one to another, without any consideration or compensation therefor, though a common-law gift, is not
necessarily a 'gift' within the meaning of the statute. For the Court has
shown that the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make such
a payment does not establish that it is a gift. . . . And, importantly, if
the payment proceeds primarily from 'the constraining force of any moral
or legal duty,' or from 'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an
economic nature, . . . it is not a gift. And, conversely, '[w]here the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor
derives no economic benefit from it.' . . . A gift in the statutory sense,
on the other hand, proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity.'
. . 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.' . . .
And in this regard, the most critical consideration, as the Court was
agreed in the leading case here, is the transferor's 'intention.' . . . 'What
controls is the intention with which payment, however voluntary, has
been made.'" (Citations omitted). Supra, n. 18, 285-286.
23 "Where a jury
has tried the matter upon correct instructions, the
only inquiry is whether It cannot be said that reasonable men could reach
differing conclusions on the issue. . . . Where the trial has been by a
judge without a jury, the judge's findings must stand unless 'clearly
erroneous' . . . . 'A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " (Citations omitted). Supra, n. 18, 290, 291.
2Griswold,
Of Time and Attitudes, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 88-89 (1960).
Dean Griswold calls this opinion "IT]he failure of 'the maturing of collective thought,' as well as of the unfortunate enlargement of the function
of the jury or other finder of the facts."
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pont).25 Judge Raum proclaimed that the Duberstein
opinion "went a long way toward bringing the problem
back into proper focus, thereby clarifying and developing
the law in this troublesome area. '26 Citing the legal
principles espoused in Duberstein, the Tax Court found
that the widow's payment was income, not gift, and that
the issue was one of fact, not of law. It was held to be
significant that the corporate resolution authorizing the
payment spoke in terms of "recognition of services" and
"continuation of salary." The opinion also stated that it
was not necessary to refer to the pre-Dubersteincases any
longer.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Judge Sobeloff vigorously challenged the Tax Court's ruling. His view was that
the following factors considered by the Tax Court in preDuberstein cases 27 are still timely:
"(1) the payments had been made to the wife of the
deceased employee and not to his estate;
(2) there was no obligation on the part of the corporation to pay any additional compensation to the deceased employee;
(3) the corporation derived no benefit from the payment;
(4) the wife of the deceased employee performed no
services for the corporation; and
(5) the services of her husband had been fully compensated."2
The Court asserted that Dubersteindoes not destroy the
value of the old cases as precedent; that, when considering
these criteria in similar factual situations, the Tax Court
had always found a gift to be present, and that, but for
Duberstein, would have done so in this case. Little significance was attached to the language used in the corporate resolution. However, the Tax Court decision was
not reversed, but, rather, was vacated and remanded so
that consideration could be given to those factors which
2535 T.C. 65 (1960).
" Id., pp. 70-71. Judge Kern, dissenting, took the view that was
eventually adopted by the Fourth Circuit on appeal. He stated that unless
Duberstein created new law, the Tax Court should be bound by its previous decisions that payments under these circumstances constituted gifts.
Duberstein, he contended, being so factually different, could not be deemed
to create new law in the area of widow's benefits.
=' See Bounds v. United States, supra, n. 14; Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C.
647, 650 (1958).
Poyner, supra, n. 1, 291.
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have become important since Duberstein and on which the
record was silent.
The significance of Judge Sobeloff's remand in the
Fourth Circuit can be more readily appreciated when it
is realized that all of the Tax Court cases decided subsequent to the Tax Court's consideration of Poyner, but
prior to the Poyner appeal, followed the Tax Court's conclusion in that case. 29 Since then, no Tax Court opinions
have issued in this area, so that it is entirely possible
that the stage may be set for a hasty retreat by the Tax
Court to its pre-Dubersteinposition.
Other of the Tax Court "income decisions" have met a
fate similar to that of Poyner. Just two weeks after the
Fourth Circuit's decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed without remand the holding in Kuntz' Estate v. C.I.R.8 0 The
only significant factual difference between Poyner and
Kuntz was that in the latter, directors and an officer of the
corporation testified as to intent to make a gift. Perhaps
this explains the refusal to remand, as done in Poyner.
The Eighth Circuit added its voice and reversed the Tax
Court decision in Olsen's Estate v. C.I.R.,81 expressly relying on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Kuntz.
The district courts, barring unusual factual situations,
have continued, even in the light of Duberstein,to find excludable gifts. Rejecting the Tax Court's interpretation of
Duberstein,the district courts have found Dubersteinapplicable only from a procedural standpoint; i.e., that the issue
is one of fact requiring case-by-case analysis and a limited
scope of review. 2 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have
affirmed this position.8
.Margaret H. D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999 (1962); Mary C. Westphal, 37
T.C. 340 (1961) ; Ray I. Martin, 36 T.C. 556 (1961) ; Est. of Louis Rosen,
T.C. Memo 1962-58; Est. of Julius B. Cronheim, T.C. Memo 1961-232;
Est. of W. R. Olsen, T.C. Memo 1961-161; Mildred W. Smith, T.C. Memo
1961-155; Est. of Irving Cooper, T.C. Memo 1961-154; Mary Fischer, T.C.
Memo 1961-61; Est. of Rose A. Russek, T.C. Memo 1961-28; Ivan Y.
Nickerson, T.C. Memo 1960-270; Estate of K:untz, T.C. Memo 1960-247.
8300 F. 2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962) rev'g T.C. Memo 1960-247.
302 F. 2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962) rev'g. T.C. Memo 1961-161.
'Rice
v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wisc. 1961) ; Wilner v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frankel v. United
States, 192 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1961); Kasynski v. U.S., 6 AFTR
2d 6060 (Colo. 1960).
In addition, four district court opinions, all
emanating from the Fifth Circuit have found gifts without specific reliance on, or even mention of Duberstein. Canning v. U.S..
F. Supp.
....
(N.D. Tex. 1962), 62-2 USTC
9593. Schwarz v. U.S.,
F. Supp.
....
(N.D. Tex. 1962), 62-2 USTC
9661. Pixton v. U.S.
F. Supp.
(S.D. Ala. 1962), 62-2 USTC
9686. Vaughn v. U.S.,
F. Supp.
(S.D. Ga. 1962), 62-2 USTC
9688.
mUnited States v. Frankel, 302 F. 2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962) aff'g. 192
F. Supp. 776 (Minn. 1961); U.S. v. Kasynski, 284 F. 2d 143 (10th Cir.
1960) aff'g. 6 AFTR 2d 6060 (Colo. 1960).

ir
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Repudiation seemed imminent for the Commissioner's
view that Duberstein has had the effect of re-interpreting
the standards to be used in deciding the proper classification of widow payments. In fact, the only two postDuberstein district court cases that have found widow's
payments to be income3 4 rejected the Commissioner's view
of Duberstein, and cited the case only as reiterating the
bare principles that intent of the donor is the governing
criterion and that this is a factual question to be handled
on a case-by-case basis. It is submitted that the Commissioner is, in fact, in error in his view of Duberstein's effect. As stated in Kuntz, Duberstein really has no application in the area of widow's payments because, (a) the taxpayer had rendered services for which he wasn't compensated, (b) the transferror was obligated in a moral sense,
and (c) the transferror3 might
be anticipating further ser5
vices from the taxpayer.
In June of 1962, the apparent trend toward uniformity
seemed to be cast aside when the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, affirming two Tax Court decisions, found for the
Commissioner. 6 Duberstein was relied on only as authority for application of the "clearly erroneous" standard
of appellate review. There is, perhaps, factual justification for the differing results reached in the Third Circuit
as compared to those reached in the Fourth (Poyner),
Sixth (Kuntz) and Eighth (Olsen) Circuits. In one of the
Third Circuit decisions, the payor-corporation followed
normal payroll procedures (Forms W-2, withholding, etc.)
in its handling of the widow's payments; in the other case,
there were a sufficient number of additional facts relied on
by the Tax Court below to reach the conclusion that additional compensation was intended, so that the Appeal
Court, applying limited review, could not hold that the
lower court decision was clearly erroneous. However, it
is to be noted that the Third Circuit had in the record be"Gaugler v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Hein v.
United States ....
F. Supp ....
(E.D. Wis. 1962) 62-2 USTC
9564.
These cases may be distinguished from the other district court cases
cited in n. 32 in that, in the Gaugler and Hein cases, a voluntary death
benefit plan creating a moral obligation was found to exist at the decedent's death. This had the effect of making the death benefit a type of
"fringe" compensation, and of evidencing an intent, other than purely
donative, ;on the part of the corporation. See, Simpson v. U.S., 261 F.
2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 944 (1959).
In addition, in Hein, there was a direct statement by a corporate
officer that the payments were not intended to be gifts.
Supra, n. 30, 852.
16Smith v. C.I.R., 305 F. 2d 778 (3d Cir. 1962) aff'g. T.C. Memo 1961155; Martin v. C.I.R., 305 F. 2d 290 (3d Cir. 1962) aff'g. 36 T.C. 556

(1961).
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fore it those very factors, the lack of which impelled Judge
Sobeloff in Poyner to remand. 7 Perhaps, had the record
been as complete, Poyner would have been decided in a
manner similar to the Third Circuit decisions.
The Commissioner, possibly because of the new lease on
life granted by the Third Circuit, requested certiorari in
Kuntz, Olsen, and Frankel. On the other hand, a similar
request was made by the taxpayers in Smith and Martin.
However, the Supreme Court has declined to rule in this
area. 3 Effectively, this means that, unless and until Congress decides to legislate, the law will remain on a caseby-case basis. The apparently conflicting results reached
by the various courts serve to point out the factual nature
of the question. However, the overwhelming weight of the
court decisions over the past years has shown that, under
normal circumstances, payments to widows have been, and
will probably continue to be, treated as gifts. It is not inconceivable that, faced with this fact, the Commissioner
will be limited to attack only in special situations (voluntary benefit plan, dividend circumstances, etc.), and ultimately, will issue an acquiescing ruling similar to that
issued in regard to cases under the 1939 Code. 39
Such a disposition of the matter would seem equitable
in the light of the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962.
Much of the contention in this area results from the fact
that corporations were taking deductions for the same
payments that were going tax-free to the widows. It would
appear that the very factors which would necessitate gift
treatment by the widow,4 0 should also serve to deny a
corporate deduction through failure of the payment to
qualify as an ordinary and necessary business expense.4 '
Unfortunately, this question has never been fully resolved
by the courts.4 2 However, Section 4 (a) (1) of the 1962 Act,
w The Poyner opinion mentioned (a) the widow's stock holdings in the
company, and (b) the company's knowledge, or lack of it, concerning her
financial needs. In a footnote, the opinion cited the Smith and Martin
decisions in the Tax Court as considering these factors. See, supra, n. 1,
292.
(1962).
.... U.S .....
Rev. Rul. 58-613, 8upra,n. 10.
See supra, n. 8.
1
However, Chief Judge Thomsen, in a factually-dominated opinion holding that certain payments constituted gifts to the widow, set forth dictum
to the effect that: "The fact that the payments were made in recognition
of the services rendered to the corporation by the decedent does not
require that they be treated as income by the widow, even if it permits
their deduction by the corporation as ordinary expenses." Corasaniti
v. United States ....
F. Supp ....
(D. Md. 1962).
"This is perhaps due to the fact that rarely are both the corporate
deduction and the widow's treatment of the income item before the same
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which becomes Section 274(b) of the 1954 Code, denies a
deduction to the payor for any business gift in excess of
$25.00 per recipient. 4 As a result, a corporation will not
be able to deduct any payment which the widow-payee
may exclude as a gift under Section 102 of the Code. This
factor could weigh heavily in any decision by the Commissioner to limit litigation in this area.
BARRY D. BERmAN

Libel From Comment On Facts Generally Known
A. S. Abell Company v. Kirby'
Appellee, a member of the Rackets Squad division of
the Baltimore City Police Department, sued for malicious
defamation in the Circuit Court of Baltimore County. The
alleged libel appeared in the editorial section of THE
MORNING SUN, a Baltimore newspaper, in an article entitled
"Not Proved", which discussed current hearings before the
Baltimore City Delegation and the Governor for the possible dismissal of the Police Commissioner for incompetency and misconduct. In referring to some twenty-five
witnesses who testified not under oath or subject to crossexamination, the editorial incidentally mentioned the plaintiff as follows: "Every important witness against the Police
court at the same time. One exception, however, was Cooper's Estate,
T.C. Memo 1961-154 (1961). There, the Tax Court found that the payments "were not gifts to the widow, but were intended as additional
compensation for services previously rendered by the decedent. Such payments therefore were not excludable from income in the hands of the
widow as gifts, and they were deductible by the corporation." It seems
implicit in this wording that Judge Raum considered the same factors
in arriving at both conclusions. The opinion went on to state that, "We
do not reach the possible question whether the corporation might in any
event deduct the payment even if they should be held to be gifts."
""Gift" is defined, in the context of this section, as any item excludable under § 102 which is not excludable under any other section.
This means that an employer's payment to the widow of a deceased
officer which is excludable from her income as a gift under § 102 would
be deductible by the employer only to the extent of $25.00, whereas, if
the payment is excludable under § 101(b) as a death benefit, § 274(b)
does not apply to it. Oommibtee Report (Revenue Act of 1962) §
4, C, 3.
'227 Md. 267, 176 A. 2d 340 (1961), rehearing den. (1962).

